International Journal of Transpersonal Studies
Volume 22

Issue 1

Article 6

1-1-2003

Mysticism and Its Cultural Expression: An Inquiry into the
Description of Mystical Experience and Its Ontological and
Epistemological Nature
Evgeny Torchinov
St. Petersburg State University, Russia

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ciis.edu/ijts-transpersonalstudies
Part of the Philosophy Commons, Psychology Commons, and the Religion Commons

Recommended Citation
Torchinov, E. (2003). Torchinov, E. (2003). Mysticism and its cultural expression: An inquiry into the
description of mystical experience and its ontological and epistemological nature. International Journal
of Transpersonal Studies, 22(1), 40–46.. International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 22 (1).
http://dx.doi.org/10.24972/ijts.2003.22.1.40

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by International Journal of Transpersonal Studies. It has
been accepted for inclusion in International Journal of Transpersonal Studies by an authorized administrator. For
more information, please contact the editors.

Mysticism and Its Cultural Expression:
An Inquiry into the Description of
Mystical Experience and Its Ontological and
Epistemological Nature
Evgeny Torchinov
St. Petersburg State University, Russia
The purpose of this paper is to critically explore the nature and ontological and epistemological
significance of differences observed in how various cultural traditions describe and explain such
experiences. After an initial consideration of definitional issues, the article focuses on the arguments supporting and challenging the idea of mystical experience being a universal phenomenon
and a vehicle for true knowledge. The article also examines the problem of the unity of the mystical experience as a definite state of consciousness and the multiplicity of its sociocultural and
civilizational expressions and descriptions conditioned by different cultural and historical factors.

T

his paper is dedicated to the examination of
the problem of the forms of cultural expressions of mystical experience. That is, the purpose of this paper is to critically explore the nature and
ontological and epistemological significance of differences observed in how various cultural traditions
describe and explain such experiences. Prior to initiating this undertaking, however, it is important to first
address definitional issues.
The word “mysticism” and all its variants and
derivatives (e.g., mystical, mystic) holds several largely
unique meanings. For example, the term is used to
designate (a) the experience or feeling of unity of the
person with the ontological ground of the Universe
and/or of all beings, (b) different esoteric rites and
practices, and (c) various forms of occultism. Further,
the word “mysticism” is laden with pejorative connotations, the most problematic of which concerns it as
being diametrically opposed to rationality as the basis
for epistemology.1 Consequently, there is a need to
exercise care in delineating what is meant by mysticism, since any discourse regarding the epistemological
and ontological features of it will likely be met with
skepticism and mistrust by the majority of Western
scholars, scientists, and philosophers.
For the sake of this paper, mystical experience will
be defined in a very specific way. In particular, it will
be used to designate a type of experience described as
40

involving the expansion of consciousness and the feeling of unity of the experient’s heart-and-mind with the
hidden (or concealed) ontological ground of all existence or with the original principle of all things and
beings. This kind of experience, which often involves
the transcendence of normal and sundry modes of
consciousness, has direct and immediate relevance to
epistemology and metaphysics.

Mystical Experience as Universal versus
Culture Bound

M

any of us use an expression such as “mystical
experience” and yet there is little in the way of
elucidation as to how such an experience arises within
consciousness and how, if at all, it conveys knowledge
of reality. In what sense can the feelings and intuitions
observed to arise in a mystical experience be considered the product of consciousness and reflective of true
knowledge? Before answering this question, we are
confronted with another query. If mystical experience
contains even an element of true knowledge, then why
are there such a great number of descriptions and
interpretations of the experience across different
traditions (e.g., Judeo-Christian, Muslim, Hindu,
Buddhist, Taoist, etc.)? Should there not be some form
of convergence of expression and meaning? Here rests
one of the major challenges of studying mystical expe-
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rience; making sense of the vast array of seemingly
divergent perspectives on the experience.
A number of scholars (e.g., Forman, 1998),
including most notably Stace (1960), who completed
a broad yet critical analysis of its phenomenology, have
argued quite convincingly that the mystical experience
is a universal phenomenon that is found in every culture and tradition. This position is most clearly supported by the essential descriptive features of the experience. Stace himself identified nine characteristics
generally common to all mystical experience (e.g.,
ineffability, noetic quality, religious quality, paradoxicality, time-space quality). Franklin (1998), as a second illustration, has asserted that all forms of mystical
experience share one fundamental quality involving
strong feelings of unity which he calls “the flavor of
nonseparateness.” Indeed, it may be argued that the
acceptance of the inherent universality of the mystical
experience is one of the defining assumptions of
transpersonal studies.
With this said, the problem of the varied expressions of the experience may be traced to two interrelated
factors, namely, (a) its inherent nonconceptual and
ineffable nature, and (b) the sociocultural and linguistic influences on the identification/detection and
interpretation of the experience. Stated another way,
the varieties of mystical experience appear to have arisen
first and foremost as a function of the inadequacies of
language in accurately capturing the flavor and immediacy of the experience and second because of differences in language and culture, which themselves bring
structure and meaning to experience. How do we
make sense of mystical experience in light of these
obfuscating elements?
One way that we may address the problem is by
dividing mystical experience into two aspects. The first
concerns the actual experience itself (i.e., the immediate apprehension or intuition) and the second relates
to its level of expression and description. The former
aspect will likely be similar across individuals and traditions while the latter will differ from person to person and culture to culture. In a related vein, the former
will be nonconceptual and nonlinguistic while the latter will involve the transference of the nonconceptual
experience to the categories and terms of the experient’s doctrine and/or thought system which, in turn, is
a product of the cultural context in which the individual is operating.
Considering the descriptive aspect, a question that

now emerges relates to the extent to which the higher
states of consciousness found in mystical experience
can be accurately expressed. Is it truly possible to
describe and express the experience or are such expressions always doomed to being inexact and, ultimately,
irrelevant in capturing the real stuff of mystical experiences? There are a variety of positions on this matter
and, unfortunately, I cannot give a final solution that
would be satisfactory to all parties. However, if it could
be acknowledged that the experience is beyond expression as it is occurring but that its subsequent description holds some veridicality, then it becomes possible
to gain a real sense of the experience through an analysis of its expressions and the associated culture-bound
doctrines that have arisen to explain the experience.
This possibility has been argued by some prominent
figures including Stace (1960), who has stated that the
mystical experience is wholly unconceptualizable and
wholly unspeakable when the very experience lasts, but
afterwards, when experience is kept in memory the situation must be changed. Now mystics have words and
concepts and they can speak about their experience in
the terms natural to their tradition or culture. Further
support for the possibility of gaining knowledge of the
experience from a doctrinally-based description arises
from the fact that the act of labeling an experience as
“nonconceptualizable” is itself a conceptualization.
Therefore, the nonconceptual character of mystical
experience cannot and should not be seen as absolute
(Burton, 1999). Interestingly, the relation of the doctrinal/conceptual and the experiential modes of
knowledge is acknowledged in some extant religious
systems (e.g., Tibetan Buddhism recognizes and struggles with the implications of knowledge gained
through critical conceptually driven investigation as
compared to knowledge acquired through the highest
states of experiential knowing [Williams, 1992].).
Finally, the association of doctrine to practice and, in
particular, the ubiquitous tendency of mystical traditions not only to advocate a “theory” of the experience
but also to put forth a structured technique or method
of cultivating consciousness to facilitate the arising of
the experience may be seen as reflecting a universal
process that is culturally variant only in terms of its
content. This process may be depicted as starting with
doctrine that leads to engagement in a psychospiritual
practice. This, in turn, gives rise to the mystical experience. Lastly, following the conclusion of the experience, the individual utilizes the doctrine to articulate
Mysticism and Culture
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the nature and meaning of the experience. In this
process, neither the doctrine nor doctrinally driven
interpretation is synonymous with the experience
itself, though both hold some potential to give some
knowledge of the experience.
Notwithstanding the argumentation about the
tenability of analyzing language as a means of garnering an understanding of mystical experience, there is
widespread recognition in the spiritual, religious, and
philosophical literature that language itself, regardless
of its particular cultural manifestation, serves as a hindrance to the direct comprehension of the experience.
As stated above, while doctrine plays a role both
preceding and following the experience, neither doctrine nor language is the experience per se.
Consequently, while language may be seen as a vehicle
to introduce the possibility and quality of mystical
experience, it must also be recognized as imperfect and
prone to distortion. Stated another way, while doctrine
may be useful in drawing our attention to the highest
levels of spirituality, it does not and cannot serve as a
substitute for the direct experience of such levels of
spirituality.2
In response to the limitations of language, virtually
all mystical traditions attempt to utilize methods of
expression that are aimed at simultaneously minimizing distortion while also granting unhindered access to
the experience itself. One of the most salient examples
of this, found most clearly in Indian spiritual traditions (e.g., Hinduism, Buddhism), concerns the use of
negative descriptions of the experience (i.e., describing
the highest mystical states in terms of what they are
not). This method of description has been referred to
as “the semantic destruction of language” (Zilberman,
1972), where the destruction of language occurs when
a description, previously based upon a symbolic form
of expression adopted by a certain tradition, is
changed into its negative form (or even paradoxical
form as is the case in the Zen koan and mondo).
Extending from this, mystical texts may be viewed in
many instances as containing statements about the
conditional or provisional character of mystical experience which, given the manner that they are described,
are intended to communicate the nature of the experience beyond the words used. The use of poetry,
metaphor, parable, and myth may also be seen as ways
in which mystics from various traditions have used
language to articulate the indescribable.
It may be inferred from this discussion that, given
42

the apparent commonality across mystical traditions to
address the challenges of language, there is an implied
agreement about the reality and concurrent ineffability of the highest spiritual experiences. That is, all traditions appear to agree that the experience is real and
inherently beyond language. Similarly, all traditions
appear to (a) use language to provide an initial sense of
what mystical experience is about, (b) manipulate language to enable the person to have the experience
without being limited to the words describing the
experience, and (c) advocate the use of practices that
take the person beyond language and into direct experiential contact with higher states of consciousness and
knowledge.
Certainly, there have always existed people who
tried to express their mystical experience in proper and
precise terms notwithstanding traditional cultural conventions. In historical perspective, usually these individuals abandoned their native traditions and either
were labeled “heretics” by the established cultural system and/or went on to found a new tradition. One of
the most famous examples is the historical Buddha,
who from the beginning of his religious career was a
heterodox hermit (shramana) who rejected the
Brahmanist interpretation of his experience of
Enlightenment (or Awakening). However, even in this
case, the descriptions of Buddha’s own experience and
the conclusions made from them by his followers were
provided in terms consistent with the Indian cultural
paradigm and its traditional language. Consequently,
it is impossible for me to agree with arguments which
maintain that all mystical experience is an intensified
psychosomatic expression of extant religious beliefs
and values (see, e.g., Gimello, 1983). The situation is
much more complicated and dialectical. Mystical
experience is by no means only the result of the influence of beliefs of the established religious doctrines.
Instead, the opposite appears to be more accurate—
mystical experience itself appears to serve as the basis
for the creation of religious and philosophical teaching
and systems (see, e.g., Forman, 1994, p. 38–49). More
particularly, the mystical experience taken separately
by and in itself is not religion per se if, by the term
“religion” we mean a system of doctrines, beliefs, cults,
and institutions.
However, the experience, when interpreted and
understood within its cultural context, provides the
experiential foundation on which such doctrines,
beliefs, and institutions are based. Of course, the
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extent to which established doctrinal traditions have
been able to adapt and assimilate such experiences
varies across the traditions (e.g., Eastern religions have
tended to be more accommodating of mystical experiences while religions in the West, especially Roman
Catholicism, have viewed such experiences as highly
suspect and threatening to the supremacy of church
doctrine). Nevertheless, it appears reasonable to maintain that both the mystical experience and the cultural
context in which an individual has the experience are
interacting and mutually structuring elements that
lead toward the development and evolution of spiritual systems. Ostensibly, much more critical research is
needed before we have an accurate understanding of
the interplay of culture and experience.

Mystical Experience and Knowledge

H

aving established, at least superficially, the universality of mystical experience, we can now turn
our attention to the first question posed in this paper:
In what sense can the feelings and intuitions observed
to arise in a mystical experience be considered the
product of consciousness and reflective of true knowledge?
Perhaps the best place to start looking for an
answer to this question is in the work of William
James, a pioneer in the study of religious and mystical
experience. James was one of the first researchers to
create a theory of the universal or pure experience as a
kind of “materia prima” (metaphorically speaking),
which is the material of which everything in the world
is “made.” Within such a conceptualization, knowledge can be understood as the relation between two
aspects of the pure experience. This is a very important
statement because it eliminates the fundamental ontological necessity of a relation between subject and
object in acquiring knowledge. It is especially important for an examination of the nature of mystical experience since, in virtually all mystical traditions, the
assertion is made that such experience transcends the
subject-object distinction (e.g., in a number of branches of Indo-Buddhist thought, the highest state of mind
or consciousness is described as advaita or advaya,
meaning non-dual). Interestingly, in one of the earliest
of the Hindu religious texts, the Brhadaranyaka
Upanishad, the highest form of mystical experience,
which involves the state of unity of Atman (self ) and
Brahman (Absolute), is not described in terms of con-

sciousness. As the author of the Upanishad maintains,
consciousness is impossible without duality of cognizer and cognized, perceiver and perceived. Instead, in
the state of religious liberation (i.e., moksha), consciousness ceases to exist and all that remains is the one
and only Atman (absolute Self ) which is non-dual and
yet, simultaneously, is also an unmediated communion with knowledge (jnana, gnosis). Following from
this, it may be argued that the “highest” mystical experience of non-duality is not really a state of consciousness at all since consciousness does not participate in
it.3 Rather, it may be best conceived as a pure non-dual
gnosis as such.
Notwithstanding the view of ancient Hindu spirituality, if the so-called mystical experience is a special
state wherein the subject-object relation is eliminated,
from the perspective of rational Western science and
philosophy—which has tended to assume the relation
is ontologically real—how can any knowledge be
derived of it or from it? Putatively, it is not the kind of
experience of which questions like “what did you
learn?” can be meaningfully asked. Instead, we tend to
speak about the mystical experience as a state of “no
mind” or about consciousness without intention
wherein knowledge is simply given. Of course, from
the standpoint of Husserl’s and Brentano’s schools of
phenomenology, such consciousness and knowledge
are impossible. The substance of the phenomenological arguments, however, have been rendered suspect by
more recent writers in the area of mystical experience
(Forman, 1998; Pike, 1992). Thus, in the end, it may
be contended that the highest experience of the mystics may be understood as consciousness directed upon
itself or consciousness that experiences itself as pure
awareness itself (Forman, 1998).
In order to evaluate the epistemological relevance
and veracity of mystical experience, it is of central
importance that we understand the states of mind of
those individuals who lay claim to having had such an
experience. Forman (1998, p. 16–17) states,
It should be clear that on empirical matters, the
statements of philosophers have no legislative force.
No matter how many Humes, Moores, or
Hamiltons observe that they cannot catch themselves devoid of perceptions, this tells us little about
what a Hindu monk, Dominican friar, or Sufi adept
might experience after years of yoga, Jesus prayer, or
Sufi dancing. Indeed, many mystics do report that
they have undergone something quite unique.
Mysticism and Culture
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It might be imagined that the philosophers cited by
Forman tried to “catch” themselves without perception
on two or three quiet furtive attempts but to little
avail. This outcome should come as no surprise since
those attempts likely would have been delimited by
their a priori commitment to their respective philosophical perspectives (much in the same way that the
mystical experience is interpreted by the doctrine used
by the experient). As a result, and likely without being
aware of the experiential implications of their attitude
of trying to seeing something about or within consciousness, these thinkers probably could not have
allowed themselves and their stance toward the subject-object dichotomy to dissolve completely. Of
course, to say this does not mean that non-dual experience was unavailable to these great thinkers. Who is
to say whether one of them might have achieved such
states of consciousness after some years of meditation,
visualization, or similar practices. Who is to say what
Professor Moore might have “seen” in his sensation of
blue had he performed twenty years of Tantric visualizations of blue mandalas. However, what I am trying
to get at here is that the mystical experience cannot be
understood logically or through the application of a
rational system of thought. Rather, it is an empirical
matter, though not one readily digestible by modern
science. As noted by Forman (1998), there are enormous differences between ordinary empirical attempts
to introspect the sensations of consciousness and a
transformative meditative path—the former does not
impose logical limits on the latter.
If one agrees with the possibility of pure experience in which there does not exist an ontologically
grounded distinction between subject and object, it
then becomes possible to examine a “subject” (or interiorized world or “phaneron” in the terminology of
Charles Pierce) as a kind of self-conscious focus of this
experience and to explore the manner in which the
subject-object distinction arises in consciousness. In
such a case, we may begin the inquiry from the position that we do not merely live in the outer world;
rather, we experience the world and it is experienced
by us. The world becomes the objective side of the
field of pure experience, while the human being
embodies the subjective aspect. In this context, the
field of pure experience as a whole may be seen as
utterly transcendent to a subject-object dichotomy,
with the reification of the dichotomy holding some
44

pragmatic value but no ontological value.
This position is very similar to that maintained by
Buddhism. Russian Buddhologist O. O. Rosenberg
has written that in Buddhist thought there is no distinction made between living beings and the contents
of their perceptions; they are one and the same entity.
Buddhism does not reject the reality of the external, it
is simply not analyzed as separate from the perception
of the experient. Rosenberg (1991) comments, “it is
only said that a human being experiencing any phenomena (e.g., a person looking at the sun), consists of
such and such elements in such and such interrelations, and so on” (p. 90).
Nevertheless, it may be supposed that some events
are not given in immediate experience but rather occur
outside of experience (e.g., the events on the other side
of the moon as maintained by B. Russell). As an argument against this point, Solovyev (1993) has contended
that even in the natural science of astronomy, gains in
knowledge of the cosmos are dependent upon empirical/experiential verification (e.g., the discovery of a
new planet by Parisian astronomer Leverier based
upon his mathematical analysis of known planetary
orbits was viewed as suspect until it was confirmed
through experience derived from use of the telescope
and spectral analysis). Thus, it does not appear tenable, at least when exploring the nature of mystical
experience, to maintain that reality occurs or can be
known outside of experience.
Taking the position consistent with Solovyev and
Buddhism most generally, it can be maintained that
experience is composed of the experiencer and the
thing to be experienced. However, it should appear
obvious that every living being experiences the world
of its (his/her) own and that the worlds (phanerons) of
different living beings differ greatly from one another
(e.g., the phanerons of humans ostensibly differ from
those of other animals). Despite this, it may be argued
that regardless of the experiencer, the ability to derive
knowledge from any given experience is contingent on
the ability to conceptually differentiate between subject and object. That is, the almost arbitrary and
abstract separation of the subject from the object has
epistemological implications—such a separation
allows the subject to know the object. Nevertheless,
such a distinction, while having a direct bearing on
epistemology, does not uncover or adequately address
the true ontological and metaphysical nature of pure
experience.
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Emerging from this is the question: Is it possible
to apprehend and know reality as prior to the world of
pure experience? Stated in a different way, is it possible
to recognize reality as it is by itself (yathabhutam)?
Proponents of mystical experience as a mode of knowing assert that it is possible. From this point of view,
the mystical experience in its highest expression may
be seen as a form of cognizing penetration. Subject
and object are embraced by a kind of unity which is
transcendent to the immanent space of pure experience, and the phenomenal interrelations of subject and
object can be perceived as a kind of reflection (or
appearance) of a highest form of non-duality (or of
advaya as mentioned in the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad
cited earlier). Consequently, one can suppose that the
phenomenological unity of pure experience needs a
source beyond it. The contents of our experience are
given to us and we are not able by our volition to
change such contents. Human subjects are not gods of
their own phanerons. Rather, the universe is given to
the subject by something transcendent to phaneron
itself (be it the transcendent “ens” matter of the materialists or the God of theists). In all likelihood, the
phenomenological unity of experience is preceded by a
ground unity of subject and object and simply due to
this natural and original unity, the experiencing subject and the empirical object may be seen as two poles
of the field of pure experience, which possess one and
the same basic nature. Thus, subjects and objects experienced are aspects of the field of pure experience. All
elements of the universe are phenomena or appearances of the fundamental unity that serves as the
ground on which all qualities of experience are constructed.

Self-Cognizing As a Vehicle to
True Knowledge
Schopenhauer noted that the only path to the
knowledge of reality as it is (or as “thing-in-itself ”
according to the Kantian phraseology adopted by
Schopenhauer) is the path of self-cognizing. All phenomena outside of the subject are given to our selfconsciousness only vicariously, from the outside.
However, insofar as we can examine ourselves, we find
that we know ourselves from the inside. Extending
from this, and assuming that the inner subject or self
is of the same nature as the whole world, it may be
maintained that the exploration of the nature of self

more readily enables the individual to discover this
underlying pervasive quality of sameness. Further, we
may ex hypothesi conclude that the so-called mystical
experience is a kind of cognizing (gnosis) that penetrates in a very special manner from inside into the
nature of the innermost self, thus revealing the character and nature of this self. At the same time, because of
the inherent unity of subject and object, this is also a
cognizing of the nature of all objective appearances as
much as they are immanent to the cognizing self and
thus attainable as knowledge of the subject. We can
describe such cognizing as movement from the conceptualized world of appearances to the nonconceptualized knowledge of nonconceptual reality as it is, or
reality as such (Tathata, or Suchness of the Buddhist
texts). In Mahayana Buddhism, this knowledge of reality is referred to as “yatha bhutam.”
Kant stated in his Critique of Pure Reason that the
knowledge of the “thing as it is” (Ding an sich) is possible only if we are able to eliminate our present forms
of sensory intuitions and uncover a new kind of non
sensory intuition. It can be said that mystical experience is such a non sensory mode of cognition.
In the end, and as stated earlier in this article, the
ultimate value and significance of mystical experience
cannot be ascertained by philosophical discourse
alone. As such, the conclusions reached in the latter
half of this paper should be interpreted as, at best, an
effort at approximating the process of how knowledge
arises in the context of subject-object duality. The epistemological and ontological issues of the researches
into the mystical experience are too important to be
neglected anymore. One can even suppose that such
studies, along with the development of philosophical
aspects of psychology (first of all, transpersonal psychology), may supply philosophy with new impetus to
overcome the difficulties of its traditional approaches,
thus opening new horizons and unknown dimensions
of our undersanding of reality.
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2. It may be argued that any description of any state of
consciousness, even the most elementary of states, cannot be done in an absolutely adequate manner.
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explicitly developed to describe the inner world of personality or inner psychic processes. That is, language
does not appear to have been designed, and is not particularly well suited, to serve as an intersubjective tool
of communication.
3. In this vein, I agree with Pike’s (1992) criticism of
Stace’s (1960) concept of introvertive mysticism.

46

The International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 2003, Volume 22

